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Although it had a a lower income level than India in 
1980, China’s 2006 per capita gross domestic product 
stands more than twice that of India’s. This paper 
investigates the role of the business environment 
in explaining China’s productivity advantage using 
recent firm-level survey data. The analysis finds that 
China has better infrastructure, more skilled workers, 
and more labor-hiring flexibility than India, but a 
worse access to finance and higher regulatory burden. 
Infrastructure appears to be a key constraint for India: 
it lags significantly behind China, yet it has important 
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The author may be contacted at lxu1@worldbank.org.  
indirect effects for the effectiveness of labor flexibility. 
Labor flexibility is also likely a major constraint for 
India, as evident in the predominance of small firms, 
the importance of firm size in accounting for India’s 
disadvantage in productivity, and the complementarity 
of proxies of labor flexibility with infrastructure and 
access to finance. Interestingly, regulatory uncertainty has 
adverse effects in India but not in China. The empirical 
analysis suggests that it is important to consider country-
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I.  Introduction 
In 1980, China and India, the two most populous countries on earth, were both very poor. 
India had a nontrivial lead in per capita GDP; per capita GDP was $2.38 per calendar day, nearly one 
dollar  more  than  in  China.
2 In  1980,  China was already more than two years into  its  gradual 
economic reforms, whereas India did not embark on  economic liberalization until 1991. Economic 
liberalization in both countries was followed by accelerated economic development.  By 2000, daily 
GDP per capita had risen to $7.30 in China and to $4.71 in India, giving China a lead of $2.59. By 
2008, China’s per capita GDP (measured using the PPP exchange rate and 2005 international dollar) 
stood at $5,515 per year, or $15.11 per calendar day, and India’s per capita GDP at $2,721 per year 
or $7.45 per day. While both China and India are success stories in economic development, the 
performance gap between China and India deserves attention. With only two countries to compare, 
macro data are of little use since time-series variations alone may not offer sufficient degrees of 
freedom for statistical inference. Using firm-level data, however, we can transcend the constraint of 
macro  data  by  examining  cross  sectional,  as  well  as  temporal,  variations.  We  can  link  firm 
productivity—presumably the most important factor contributing to income per capita (Islam 1995; 
Hall  and  Jones  1999)—to  city-level  business  environment,  such  as  skills,  infrastructure,  labor 
regulation, regulation burden, and access to finance. In particular, we recognize that constraints to 
economic development tend to be location-specific. Following the diagnostic approach to growth 
(Hausman et al. 2005), we employ firm level data to identify key constraints to development (Lin and 
Monga 2010). Our presumption is that, even within a country, there are sufficient variations in the 
city-level aggregates that we can use to gauge the effects of the policy and business environment on 
firm-level productivity. 
Our firm-level data are from comparable samples of manufacturing businesses in the two 
countries, namely, the World Bank–sponsored Investment Climate Surveys conducted in 2003. The 
Indian  survey  covers  1,860  manufacturing  establishments  sampled  from  the  country’s  top  40 
industrial cities and major exporting industries. The Chinese survey covers 2,400 enterprises sampled 
from 18 cities covering 15 provinces and 5 geographic regions. In addition to collecting annual data 
on each sample firm’s characteristics, financial accounts and operations between 2000 and 2002, the 
survey also collected data on the local business and policy environment that each sample firm faced 
                                                           
2 We calculate daily income based on GDP per capita, measured using purchasing-power-parity (PPP) exchange rate 
and 2005 constant international dollar, as reported in the 2010 World Development Indicators published by the 
World Bank. Per capita GDP in China was $1.43 per calendar day in 1980.    
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between 2000 and 2002. The available data allow us to construct indicators measuring the quality of 
firms’ external environment at the city level along these dimensions: infrastructure, labor market 
practices, labor skills, regulatory burden, and access to bank finance.  
Our empirical findings confirm that by the early 2000s, Chinese firms already had a sizable 
and statistically significant lead in total factor productivity (TFP) relative to their Indian counterparts. 
We also find that the China-India productivity gap is attributable to some environmental factors. Not 
surprisingly, we find that workers’ ability to use computers matters. Chinese firms employ more 
skilled labor than Indian firms, as measured by the percent of workers who use computers in a city. A 
greater  use  of  labor  with  a  higher  level  of  skills  is  positively  and  significantly  correlated  with 
Chinese  firms’  TFP,  but  not  with  Indian  firms’  TFP.  China’s  labor  skill  advantage  explains  a 
nontrivial part of China’s productivity advantage at the firm level. 
Chinese firms have significantly less access to short-term bank financing than Indian firms, 
irrespective of firm size. On average, access to short-term finance in neither country is significantly 
related to productivity. In India, we also identify an import indirect effect from easier access to short-
term bank loans: it improves the return to labor flexibility. The role played by infrastructure (using 
power supply reliability as a proxy) is complex. On average, it does not directly affect productivity in 
either country. However, it has important indirect effects in India: a better local infrastructure allows 
firms to benefit more from a more flexible labor market.  
Labor  markets  are  more  flexible  in  China  than  in  India.  First,  nonpermanent  workers 
compose a larger fraction of employment among firms in China than in India. Moreover, Indian laws 
severely hamper firms’ ability to hire and fire workers once their employee counts reach certain 
thresholds (such as 50 employees), leading to the predominance of small firms in the Indian economy. 
Indeed, around 80 percent of sampled Indian firms employ fewer than 50 employees, while only 
around 20 percent of Chinese sample firms are this small. We find that the share of nonpermanent 
workers has a greater productivity advantage in India than in China, suggesting that labor flexibility 
is a stronger constraint in India. Moreover, we find that the share of nonpermanent workers and the 
share of large firms have important indirect effects by causing the return of access to bank finance 
and the return to infrastructure to increase in India.  
The paper is related to three strands of literature. The first is the literature on the China–India 
comparison in economic performance. Bosworth and Collins (2007) and Dong and Pandey (2008)  
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use macro (sector-level) time series data to conduct growth-accounting exercises to compare China 
and India’s productivity growth patterns. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) use firm-level data to quantify 
resource  misallocation  in  China  and  India  and  find  substantial  gains  from  correcting  resource 
misallocation in both countries, with gains in India substantially larger. Our paper differs in that we 
focus on policy and environmental factors that may explain India’s disadvantage in performance and 
find that labor regulations and infrastructure seem to be particularly relevant.  
The  second  related  literature  links  Indian  economic  performance  with  its  labor  market 
flexibility. Besley and Burgess (2004) use state-level panel data from India to investigate the impact 
of  labor  regulation  on  state  economic  performance  and  find  that  pro-labor  regulations  hinder 
economic performance. Amin (2009a, b) find that cumbersome labor regulations in India lead to 
smaller firm sizes, more informality, and inefficient adoption of labor-saving computer technology. 
Aghion et al (2008) link the elimination of the system of industrial regulation with state-industry-
level performance over time in India. They find the growth effects of de-licensing to be significantly 
stronger in states with pro-employer than in pro-employee labor regulations. World Bank (2010) 
argues that labor regulations in India encourage informality and dualism in India. We add firm-level 
evidence on the complementarity between labor flexibility, infrastructure and access to finance in 
India.  
The third strand of related literature analyzes the impact of measurable business climate on 
firm  performance.  Since  Stern  (2002)  argues  for  improving  business  climate  and  overcoming 
government  failure  as  a  strategy  for  development,  the  World  Bank  has  conducted  numerous 
investment climate surveys in developing countries.
3 The existing studies have tended to assume 
identical effects of business climate on firm performance across countries. Our results suggest that, 
consistent with Hausman et al. (2005) and Kremer (1993), it is critical to allow for heterogeneous 
policy effects, to recognize local variations in policies and policy implem entations within the same 
country, to consider interactions among various elements of the business climate, and to identify 
country-specific bottlenecks in economic development. 
 
                                                           
3See Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2008), Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier, and Mengistae (2005), Cull 
and Xu (2005), Cai et al. (forthcoming), Harrison et al. (2011), Hallward-Driemeier, Wallsten, and Xu (2006) on the 





II.   Research Strategy, Data, and Preliminary Comparisons  
  We aim to understand how differences in business environments contribute to the gap in 
economic  performance  between  China and  India using  firm-level  data.  Given  the importance  of 
productivity  in  income  determination,  we  use  total  factor  productivity  (TFP)  to  measure  firm 
performance. Indeed, TFP has been shown to be a major source of output growth (Solow 1957; 
Jorgenson and Griliches 1967). Moreover, TFP levels are highly correlated with income per capita 
(Islam 1995; Hall and Jones 1999). In a survey of economic growth, Helpman (2004, p. 33) states, 
―There is convincing evidence that total factor productivity plays a major role in accounting for the 
observed  cross-country  variations  in  income  per  worker  and  patterns  of  economic  growth.  We 
therefore need to understand what drives the differences in total factor productivity.‖ For this paper, 
we focus on understanding the TFP differences at the firm level between the two countries. For 
robustness  checks,  we  also  used  labor  productivity,  measured  by  value  added  per  employee  in 
logarithmic scale, as an alternative dependent variable and we found similar results. In our data, TFP 
measures are closely correlated with labor productivity, with a statistically significant correlation 
coefficient of 0.61.  
We proceed in three steps. First, we estimate total factor productivity for each firm in our 
sample. We then use available data to construct proxies for known business environmental factors 
that affect firms. At the last step, we estimate the effects of the proxies of the business environment 
on  firm  productivity  using  regression  analysis.  Our  presumption  is  that  even  firms  in  the  same 
country face different business environments at the local level. A caveat is that our results are only as 
representative as our sample. For example, our data do not reveal policy impacts on firm entry and 
exits.  Also,  because  our  data  cover  only  manufacturing  firms,  our  results  do  not  apply  to 
nonmanufacturing  sectors.  Finally,  our  sample  does  not  contain  what  some  view  as  the  most 
productive  sector  in  India—the  software  industry—which  may  bias  our  estimates  and  overstate 
China’s productivity advantage. 
Data  
We draw our firm-level data from World Bank surveys on the two countries’ investment 
climate in 2003. The two surveys are similar in sample design and survey instruments. However, 
some differences remain. The India survey covered 1,860 manufacturing establishments, sampled  
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from the largest 40 industrial cities in the country, which were selected from 12 of the largest 15 
states by picking the largest three or four industrial centers from each state. These 12 states were 
Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Haryana, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, 
Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. These  states account for more than 90 percent of 
India’s industrial GDP while the three or four cities covered in each state accounted for the bulk of 
manufacturing  outputs  of  their  respective  states.  In  each  city,  samples  were  drawn  from  the 
population of firms with more than 10 workers and in one of the eight exporting or import competing 
manufacturing industries.
4 The total sample was allocated among states in proportion to a state’s 
share in the national employment total of the eight industries. The systematic sampling rule sets an 
establishment’s probability of selection proportional to the establishment’s number of employees.  
In  the  China  survey,  2,400  enterprises  were  sampled  from  18  cities  in  15  provinces 
considered  to  be  representative  of  China  five  geographic  divisions.  The  cities  include  in  the 
northeastern  region,  Benxi  and  Dalian  (Liaoning  Province),  Changchun  (Jilin),  and  Harbin 
(Heilongjiang); in the coastal region, Hangzhou and Wenzhou (Zhejiang), Jiangmen and Shenzhen 
(Guangdong); in the central region, Changsha (Hunan), Nanchang (Jiangxi), Wuhan (Hubei), and 
Zhengzhou (Henan); in the southeastern region, Guiyang (Guizhou), Chongqing (Sichuan), Kunming 
(Yunnan), and Nanning (Guangxi); and in the northwestern region,  Lanzhou (Gansu) and Xi’an 
(Shaanxi). The total GDP of these provinces accounted for almost exactly half of the national GDP in 
2007.
5  Each of the selected cities was allotted a sample size of either 100 or 150 firms. These firms 
were then randomly drawn from an electronic database of firms. Unlike the India survey, the China 
survey  sampled  firms  from  manufacturing  and  service  industries.
6 The  sample  in  China  was 
restricted to businesses that had an employment size more than 20 workers for manufacturing and 15 
employees for service industries.  
To ensure comparability, we select only manufacturing firms drawn from the industries 
covered in both the India and  the China surveys.
7 In addition, while Indian firms are largely all 
private firms, some Chinese firms in our sample are state owned. Many commentators suggest that 
                                                           
4 The industries are textiles, garments and leather goods, household electronics, electrical equipment and parts, auto 
and parts, food processing, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and metallurgical products and tools.  
5 National Bureau of Statistics, http://www.stats.gov.cn, accessed March 1, 2010. 
6 The manufacturing industries include garments and leather goods, household electronics, electrical equipment and 
parts, auto and parts, food processing, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, metallurgical products and tools, and 
transport equipment.  
7As a result, we exclude textiles producers from the India sample and establishments in services and transport 
equipment sectors from the China sample.  
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China’s growth is largely due to the emergence of private firms. Private firms have indeed grown 
more rapidly in China than state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to dominate job creation and production. 
In 2000 and 2005, the share of state-owned employers account for only 32 percent and 24 percent of 
total employment. To make the sample as comparable as possible, in this paper we keep only private 
firms in the China sample. Our final sample comprises 1,164 private firms in China and 1,597 firms 
in India. The distribution of these by industry is shown in table 1.  
Productivity Estimation 
While for our later regressions we shall only use one year of data due to the lack of variations 
for our key variables, for estimation of productivity we use three years of panel data. We assume that 
the  value added,     , in firm   of industry   in year  , can be expressed  by the following  Cobb-
Douglas production function, 
             
             
                 (1)  
where      is firm  ’s capital stock, measured by the book value of fixed assets at the end of the fiscal 
year  ,      is labor input, measured by the average number of employees in fiscal year  , and      is 
the error term. In order to make cross-country comparison meaningful,      and     , are converted 
from units in local currencies to constant U.S. dollars using market exchange rates. Making use of 
three years of available data, we estimate TFP as the residual using the fixed-effects specification by 
assuming that                 , where    measures firm-specific fixed effects on productivity. 
A  major  concern  with  the  fixed-effects  specification  is  that  productivity  may  have  a 
component directly linked to a state variable, which in turn affects input choices: Inherently more 
productive firms would, under a competitive market mechanism or profit-oriented planners, employ 
more  resources.  Fixed-effects  regressions  may  therefore  produce  inconsistent  estimates  of  the 
production-function  parameters.
8  To  address  this  problem ,  we  use  the  Levinsohn -Petrin  (LP) 
estimator (Levinsohn and Petrin 2003). Because the LP approach is more general than the fixed -
                                                           
8 The main references on this problem and proposed solutions are Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003). See also Ackerberg, Caves, and Fraser (2006) for a critique of the Levinsohn-Petrin estimator we have used 
here, and see Wooldridge (2005) for the interpretation in a system equation framework. Ackerberg, Caves, and 
Fraser (2006) use the same invertibility condition as Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) but only a subset of the moments 
proposed by LP for estimation (Petrin and Sivadasan 2006). The criticisms of Ackerberg and Caves (2003) would be 
important when the variable input (labor) is a deterministic function of the state variable (say capital) and the proxy 
variable (material here) (Wooldridge 2005). To check this possibility, we regress log(labor) onto log(capital) and 
log(material) for each industry, and the R squares are around 0.6 to 0.8, far from being deterministic, so we are not 
worried about the Ackerberg and Caves criticism of the LP procedure in our context.   
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effects  approach—which  imposes  time-invariant  productivity—and  directly  deals  with  the 
simultaneity issue, we shall mainly rely on the LP productivity estimates in our comparative analysis. 
However, we note that the correlation between the LP (tfpLP) and the fixed-effects productivity is 
quite high: 0.73. In sensitivity checks, we also use log labor productivity (measured as log value 
added per employees) as our productivity measure. The correlation of TFP and log labor productivity 
is also quite high at 0.61. 
We use value added as our output measure since material inputs are the non-state input that 
the  Levinsohn-Petrin  procedure  uses  to  correct  for  simultaneity  biases  in  estimating  the  Cobb-
Douglas  production  function.  As  it  turns  out,  in  some  firms,  the  reported  sales  are  less  than 
expenditures on intermediate inputs, resulting in negative value added. There are many reasons for 
this. Our sample period happens to cover a global recession after the bursting of the technology 
bubble.  Some of our sample firms (in particular, exporters and firms that face import competition) 
could be experiencing recession induced distress. Our sample also includes young firms and some of 
the young firms could still be learning how to do business. There is also the possibility that some 
firms simply underreported their cash sales for the purpose of evading taxes. 
It is tempting to simply discard firm-year observations with negative value-added. Doing so, 
however, could bias the comparative analysis of firm-level productivity between China and India 
since we would have to drop more Indian firms than Chinese firms from the survey samples. Instead, 
we drop 7.7 percent of firms on the bottom end of the distribution of value added per employees from 
each country’s sample and use the remaining sample to estimate the production function of each 
industry.
9 To the extent that the dropped Chinese firms are m ore efficient than Indian firms, our 
estimates would under-estimate China’s advantage. But we believe the difference should be minor 
because both sets of firms are the worst performers. 
Performance Differences  
We present productivity estimates for the two countries in table 2. Relative to Indian firms, 
Chinese firms, on average, have a much higher level of TFP. The median firm’s TFP in the China 
sample exceeds that in the India sample by 1.27 or 127 log points, which means that the median 
                                                           
9 The 7.7 percent city cut-off point ensures that all Indian firms with positive value added are included, but this 
means that some Chinese firms had to be dropped even when they had positive value added.   
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Chinese firm is 156 percent more productive than the median India sample.
10 Comparing sample 
means, Chinese firm’s TFP advantage is a slightly smaller 120 log points. Chinese firms, on average, 
also have a positive, but statistically insignificant lead in TFP growth. The mean TFP growth rate in 
the China sample is 0.5 percentage points higher than in the India sample (3.6 percent for China and 
2.9 percent for India), but this difference is not statistically significant. Given the dramatic difference 
in TFP levels and statistically insignificant difference in TFP growth rates, our analysis below will 
focus on comparing TFP levels.  
Differences in Firm Characteristics 
Chinese firms are much larger than Indian firms, whether we measure firm size by value 
added or by the number of employees. While the mean number of employees is only 88 in India, it is 
roughly 400 in China. The distribution of firm size measured by the number of employees in either 
the China sample or the India sample is skewed to the left. The median firm in the China sample 
employs 134 workers while the median firm in the Indian sample employs only 15 workers.
11 If 
measured in total value added (in millions of 1999 U.S. dollars) , China’s mean is 6 times as large 
(6.4 million versus 1 million), China’s median is almost 14 times as large.  Chinese firms also tend to 
be younger. The median firm in the China sample is 8 years old, 4 years younger than its Indian 
counterpart, a fact suggesting a more dynamic economy in China. 
III.   Measuring City-Level Business Environments 
Stern  (2002)  notes  that  it  is  the  ―policy,  institutional,  and  behavioral  environment,  both 
present and expected, that influences the returns, and risks, associated with investment‖ in a specific 
location. In other words, the business environment covers whatever external environment that affects 
the  returns  and  risks  faced  by  investors.  Following  this  definition,  we  proxy  the  business 
environment, drawn from the literature on growth, on the following usual suspects:
 (a) quality of 
physical infrastructure, (b) skill level of local workforce, (c) access to finance, (d) flexibility in labor 
                                                           
10 We have tested the statistical significance of the difference in TFP between China and India, and it’s significant at 
the 1 percent level. 
11 While by survey design, Indian firms are supposed to have more than 10 employees, and Chinese firms, more than 
20 employees, the Indian sample has 25 percent of firms with less than or equal to 10 employees, and the Chinese 
sample has around 4 percent of firms with less than or equal to 20 employees. If we restrict the samples of both 
countries to have more than 20 employees, the median firm size for China is still much larger, 140 in comparison to 
46.5 in India.    
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market, and (e) the deal environment.
12 Why and how does the business environment matter for firm 
performance? 
  Good  infrastructure  (e.g.,  roads  and  power)  would  reduce  transaction,  logistics  and 
production costs for firms. For instance, in the case of power, a reliable supply of power would 
reduce or eliminate the need for individual firms to produce power in house, thereby realizing the 
economy of scale associated with power production. It also reduces the amount of capital needed for 
starting a new firm. 
  The level of skills in a locality may matter for productivity of local firms for several reasons. 
It  makes  hiring  qualified  staff  members  easier  and,  therefore,  reduces  or  eliminates  the  skill 
bottlenecks for local firms. Moreover, human capital externality at the local level may increase the 
productivity  of  individual  firms  (Lucas  1988),  and  may  also  encourage  entrepreneurship  and 
innovations.  Finally, if product quality is determined by the probability of not making mistakes in 
each task (the O-ring theory), the level of production efficiency would depend on the distribution of 
skills for all staffs (Kremer 1993). 
  We also include the ease with which firms can obtain short-term bank loans, our measure of 
access to finance, to be part of the determinants of firm productivity; following a vast amount of 
literature linking financial development to growth (see Levine [1997] for a summary). After all, the 
development of financial infrastructure allows firms to expand without solely  relying on internal 
saving, reducing transaction costs between firms, and increasing the scope for specialization of firms. 
Labor inflexibility likely would reduce productivity (see Xu forthcoming for a summary of 
recent firm-level evidence). It increases the costs of adjusting a firm’s scale of operation. When hit 
by adverse demand shocks, firms would optimally reduce their workforces. Firing inflexibility would 
delay  or  prevent  such  adjustments  and,  therefore,  increase  operating  costs  and  reduce  firm 
profitability. Anticipating this, firms may become reluctant to expand and, therefore, fail to capture 
the economy of scale otherwise possible. Indeed, Fallon (1987) and Fallon and Lucas (1993) find that 
strengthening  labor  regulation  in  India  was  associated  with  lower  labor  demand  for  large  firms 
covered by the regulation, but not for small firms not covered by the regulations. Amin (2009a) find 
                                                           
12 For more discussion, see, for example, Stern (2002) and Xu (forthcoming).  There could be other important 
determinants; our selection is undoubtedly constrained by data availability.  The China and India Enterprise Surveys 




that cumbersome labor regulation in India leads to smaller firm sizes and more informality. Moreover, 
firms may fail to adopt technologies that can benefit only large firms, therefore further blocking the 
channels for innovation and technology adoption. 
The deal environment faced by a firm matters in subtle ways to firm (Hallward-Driemeier et 
al. 2010).  While the de jure regulations are the same within the same location or a country—say, the 
environment regulators should inspect a firm twice a year—the de facto regulatory burdens differ 
greatly among firms.  In places where one can make deals and in places where the deal environment 
is more certain (i.e., the standard deviation of the regulatory burden is smaller), firms may have the 
option to circumvent cumbersome regulations and to do so with lower costs, and firms therefore 
should perform better. 
While these factors might affect productivity, it is also conceivable that they may not be 
important  in  reality—it  all  depends  on  the  economic  environment  (Hausman  et  al.  2005.  Xu 
forthcoming). It is entirely possible that some economies are stuck with some bottlenecks elsewhere 
such that some of these factors may not matter after all (Kremer 1993). When technologies feature 
strong  complementarity,  a  bottleneck  such  as  skills  may  reduce  the  quality  of  inputs  for  the 
production process, directly lowering productivity. Moreover, the bottleneck may indirectly reduce 
incentives for workers to invest in human capital when the bottleneck reduces the return to human 
capital, further reducing skill improvements and productivity. Some bottlenecks then may keep the 
economy in a bad equilibrium for a long time. We shall let the data to inform us whether the business 
environment affects productivity. Below we discuss how we use available data to measure elements 
of the local business environment.   
The quality of local physical infrastructure. While poor infrastructure is often cited as one 
of the key bottlenecks to growth in India (Pinto, Zahir, and Pang 2006), China has invested heavily 
on infrastructure. Since the mid-1990s, China has invested between 15-20 percent of its GDP on 
infrastructure. Infrastructure investment in India, in contrast, has averaged less than 7 percent of GDP. 
In absolute terms, China’s infrastructure investment is about 8 times that of India’s since the mid-
1990s to the early 2000s (Ahya and Xie 2004).
13 Within the category of infrastructure, studies have 
                                                           
13  A reason for the gap is that ―a fiscal deficit of about 10 percent of GDP makes it hard for the India 
government to invest adequately in public infrastructure. The Chinese fiscal deficit is much lower (about 2 percent) 
and their tax-GDP ratio (at about 20 percent) is much higher, which along with larger household and corporate 




focused  in  particular  on  expensive  and  unreliable  power  supply  as  a  source  of  development 
bottleneck in India (World Bank 2004). In China, reliability of power supply has also been a concern. 
We therefore proxy for the quality of physical infrastructure that a firm faces in the city 
where it is located by the city average of the negative of the proportion of annual sales lost due to 
power outages that other businesses in the city report in the World Bank surveys. By excluding the 
firm’s own report, we hope to minimize simultaneity biases caused by a likely reverse causation 
where  a  more  productive  firm  is  better  equipped  to  deal  with  power  outages,  by,  for  example, 
investing in onsite power generating capacity. On average, sample Indian firms report 9 percent in 
lost sales against 2 percent in the China sample (table 3). The median difference is also 7 percent and 
statistically significant. Thus, China leads India in the quality of power supply.
14    
An alternative measure of power supply is the city share of firms having their own generators, 
which is also available from the data set. Using own generators is obviously a more expensive way to 
supply electricity for normal operations. In general, own generating capacity is often used as a source 
of emergency backup power. It would be more costly to rely on it for normal usage, and  would 
require more capital expenditure to scale up when the firm expands production. In addition, a firm 
that uses continuous production processes would find any disruption in power supply unacceptable 
and would therefore invest in  onsite emergency power even if external power supply is deemed 
reliable. The installation of emergency generating capacity by firms may not be a clean indicator of 
poor reliability of power supply from the grid. It is unfortunate that t he surveys did not make a 
distinction between investing in own generating capacity  as a substitute for electricity supply from 
the grid or as an emergency backup in the event that power transmission from the grid is interrupted 
                                                           
14  Some argue that roads (quantity and quality) are a better measure of infrastructure. We do not have city-
level measures of road quantity and quality. However, the significant advantage of China in infrastructure should 
hold up if we instead rely on road measures. According to Postigo (2008), China has approximately 40,000 km of 
expressways, while India has only 300 km. Business perception of road quality is 4.6 (out of the 1–7 scale, with 1 
being the worst and 7 being the best) in China, significantly higher than in India (3.0). The disadvantage of India is 
also reflected in its input: investment in road infrastructure accounts for 0.5 percent of India’s GDP, but 3.5 percent 
in China. Moreover, the majority of roads are built in the countryside in India while most roads in China are for an 
expressway. India does have more total mileage in terms of road networks, but these are largely low-quality rural 
roads. Since all of our sample firms are located in cities, and what are relevant for them are largely high-quality 
expressways and paved ways, we’re confident that China’s advantage in infrastructure would be even more dramatic 
than as measured by power reliability.  
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by, for instance, increment weather. As a result, we do not find the variable measuring the share of 
firms having own generators a convincing measure of power supply reliability.
15  
  Skill  level  of  local  workforce.  The  picture  that  emerges  from  comparing  conventional 
indicators of labor force skills between the two countries is rather mixed. China has the advantage on 
adult literacy and school enrollment rates (including those for tertiary education), but some believe 
India has more qualified engineers (Deutsche Bank 2005). In 2003, India’s adult literacy rate stood at 
68 percent while China’s was 95 percent (Deutsche Bank 2005). The tertiary enrollment rates for 
2003 were 11 percent for India and 13 percent for China (Bardhan 2006). 
Since the surveys did not ask firms to report information on education attainments of their 
workers, we construct a proxy of the skill level of local workers that each firm faces in the city where 
it is located by the city average  proportion of workers who regularly use computers  at work as 
reported by other firms located in the same city.  We exclude the firm’s own report in order to 
minimize simultaneity biases caused by a likely reverse causation where more productive firms are 
able to hire more skilled workers. Our proxy indicates that Chinese firms have a slight edge. On 
average, 22.2 percent of Chinese workers use computers regularly on the job, as compared to 16.7 
percent of Indian workers. The median difference is 3 percentage points and statistically significant. 
A caveat is that our proxy may capture not just the skill level of the local labor force, but also other 
things such as the adoption of information technology (IT) in business. So, while we conveniently 
refer to this proxy as an indicator of skills, it can be interpreted as the penetration of IT as well. 
Access to finance. Since both countries share a basic feature of their financial system--a high 
level of government ownership of the banking system and high levels of government intervention 
(Cull and Xu 2000 and 2003; Dobson 2006; Bardhan 2006)--how much each country’s financial 
system contributes to firm-level performance remains to be seen. We capture the firm-level access to 
short-term formal finance by whether a firm has an overdraft facility from its banks, which is also 
used in the previous literature to measure formal access to finance (Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier, and 
Mengistae 2005). Our measure of the ease of access to short-term bank finance that a firm faces in 
the city where it is located is the city average proportion of all other firms in the same city that report 
having  bank overdraft facility. By this measure, Indian firms report easier access to finance than 
their Chinese counterparts: 26 percent of Chinese firms vs. 59 percent of Indian firms report having 
                                                           
15  We did robustness checks by using the share of firms having own generators as an explanatory variable. 
We found that the variable has little power in explaining cross-sectional variations in productivity.   
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an overdraft facility (table 3). We recognize that this variable does not capture well the ease with 
which firms can obtain external finance for long-term investment.
16  
Labor market flexibility. In the past, both India and China have suffered from excessive 
government-directed  resource  allocation.  Their  recent  impressive  growth  is  widely  considered  a 
result of the restoration of market-based resources allocation (Li 1997; Lin, Cai, and Li 2003). A key 
market-oriented reform has been the introduction of labor market flexibility.  
China  started  liberalizing  the  labor  market  from  the  mid-1980s  and  deepened  the 
liberalization with ownership and labor-restructuring reforms from the late 1990s. The reforms have 
given Chinese firms more flexibility than Indian firms have in adjusting staffing to meet changing 
economic conditions and to take advantage of technological developments (Ahya and Xie 2004; 
Dong and Xu 2009). The immediate consequence of China’s labor market reforms is that firms can 
hire temporary workers. Chinese firms have taken advantage of this flexibility by increasing the 
proportion of workers on temporary contracts.  
In  India,  the  existing  labor  codes  require  businesses  that  have  more  than  a  threshold  of 
employees  to  seek  permission  from  state  governments  for  closing  a  business  or  downsizing. 
17Permissions are rarely granted (Sachs, Varshney, and Bajpai 1999). Moreover, the threshold differs 
across states since both central and state governments are empowered to act on legislations related to 
trade  unions  and  labor  disputes  (Besley  and  Burgess  2004).   This  is  believed  to  have  added 
significantly to the duration of insolvency procedures in the country, forci ng firms to maintain 
suboptimal sizes. Related items of the Indian labor laws include the ―service-rules‖ provisions of the 
Industrial Employment Act of 1946 and the provisions of the Contract Labor Act of 1970. The 
Industrial Employment Act requires defining job content, employee status, and area of work by state 
law  or  by  collective  agreement,  after  which  changes  would  not  be  made  without  all  workers’ 
consent.
18 This has made it difficult for businesses ―to shift workers not only between plants and 
locations, but also between different jobs in the same plant‖ (Zagha 1999). 
To  circumvent  the  restrictions,  Indian  businesses  may  resort  to  contract workers  per  the 
provision of the Contract Labor Act. However, this law also gives state governments the right to 
                                                           
16 We have examined the robustness of this result with respect to sectoral composition, and find that the conclusion 
remains largely the same. 
17 See also World Bank (2010) for details on labor regulation in India. 
18 This applies to establishments with more than 100 employees. Zagha (1999) notes that some states have made the 
provisions mandatory to firms with 50 or more workers while other states have abolished the size limit altogether.  
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abolish contract labor in any industry in any part of the state. In states where recourse to contract 
labor has been more restricted as a result, the only ways of maintaining employment flexibility are to 
keep employment below the regulation threshold or to contract out jobs. Variations in the strictness 
of the enforcement of labor laws in India seem to be highly correlated with the proportion of contract 
labor. Given the institutional background, it is not surprising that Clark and Wolcott (2003) and 
Bardhan (2006) also conjecture that labor market inflexibility could be one important reason behind 
China’s advantage over India. 
To measure the local labor market flexibility that a firm faces in the city where it is located, 
we use the city average proportion of nonpermanent employees in the workforce as reported by other 
firms in the same city. For an additional measure of local labor flexibility that a firm faces in the city 
where it is located, we compute the city average proportion of all other firms in the same city with 
more than 50 employees. Our second measure is constructed based on the principle of ―revealed costs‖ 
of labor regulation: To the extent that labor regulation in a city is less onerous, more firms there 
should be willing to step over the labor regulation threshold. Finally, a firm’s lagged size (e.g., the 
number of employees) also may partially reflect the results of labor regulation.
19  Table 3 suggests 
that the Chinese labor market is more flexible. Although the difference between the mean proportions 
of nonpermanent workers is minor, the median proportion in China is almost four times that of India. 
In terms of the city share of large firms, China is more than three times as high as India (78 versus 22 
percent). Similarly, the median firm size in China is 134 employees, in sharp contrast to only 18 in 
India. This difference is even more remarkable considering that the median firm is 4 years younger in 
the China sample than in the Indian sample.  
To measure the deal environment, an aspect of governance, we follow Hallward-Dreimeier et 
al. (2010). We construct two variables. The first captures the extent that deals can be done, and it is 
measured as the share of senior manager s’ time that is used in dealing with government regulators 
(―the average time cost‖). Since managers choose how much time they are willing to spend to lobby 
regulators, they would choose to spend more time lobbying if the  expected gains from lobbying 
exceed  the  opportunity  cost  of  their  time.  A  larger  value  of  this  variable  may  thus  mean  that 
managers expect a greater likelihood of success in influencing government regulators. Interpreted 
this way, this measure should have positive effect on firm-level performance. This is similar to what 
is found in China, in which firms spend money to wine and dine government officials and such 
                                                           
19 We have checked that the qualitative results about these measures of labor flexibility is the same if we control for 
sectoral composition in a city.   
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expenditures  are  found  to  have  private  benefits  to  firms  in  some  circumstances  (Cai  et  al. 
forthcoming).  Alternatively,  this  measures  the  average  regulatory  burden,  which  should  have 
negative effects on firm performance.  
The second variable is the standard deviation of the share of senior managers’ time that is 
spent in dealing with government regulators in the same city (―deal uncertainty‖). A larger value 
means that the deal environment is more arbitrary and less certain. We expect this variable to have a 
negative effect on firm performance.  Indeed, based on the World Bank Enterprise Surveys of around 
100 countries, Hallward-Dreimeier et al. (2010) find evidence that the average time cost has positive 
effects  while  deal  uncertainty  has  a  negative  effect  on  firm  performance.    However,  as  we 
emphasized, policy effects may differ in specific contexts. For instance, the effects of regulatory 
burdens and uncertainty may depend on the organizational details of bureaucracy.  When firms have 
to go through decentralized corruption—that is, when firms have to bribe multiple, decentralized 
government regulators, and each regulator has discretion to stop the deal—the effect of regulatory 
burden and arbitrariness may be more pronounced (Shleifer and Vishney 1993, Berkowitz and Li 
2000). Many observers of corruption have viewed India’s corruption and regulation as typical of a 
decentralized setup, while China as being typical of a centralized setup (Berkowitz and Li 2000, Sun 
and Johnson 2009). We therefore expect the effects of these two variables to be more pronounced in 
India than in China. Table 3 shows that China features both higher time costs and deal uncertainty.  
While Indian firms on average spent 14% of their senior managers’ time on dealing with regulators, 
the corresponding number of China is 20%.  There are significant more variations in deal uncertainty 
in China as well: the standard deviation of this time cost is 13% in India, but 17% in China. 
To summarize, relative to India, China has a better infrastructure (as measured by the share 
of losses of sales due to power outage), uses more skilled labor, and has greater flexibility in labor 
market. In contrast, Indian firms have better accesses to short-term bank finance and lower regulatory 
time costs and deal uncertainty than Chinese firms. 
 
IV.    Empirical Results 
We  now  conduct  empirical  analyses  to  examine  the  significance  of  these  business 
environment  factors  in  affecting  firm-level  productivity.  We  run  cross-sectional  regressions  as 
follows, along with some more restricted versions:  
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                   (2) 
Here the dependent variable,       , is the total factor productivity of firm   in city  , industry   and 
country  ,    
   is a row vector of firm  ’s characteristics that may affect productivity (such as firm age 
and firm size), and    
   is a row vector that captures the local business environment in city   and 
country  . We allow for country-specific effects,   , which would capture the productivity effects of 
country-specific  factors,  including  culture  and  the  political  system.  We  also  allow  for  industry-
specific effects,   . We allow the effects of firm characteristics to differ by country. 
For the business environment factors, we include two components. The first is the direct 
effects of local business environment, captured by the second term on the right hand side of (2). In 
the specification, we allow the direct effects to differ by country. The inclusion of this term follows 
the diagnostic approach to growth (Hausman, Rodrik, and Velasco 2005), which emphasizes country-
specific  impact  of  policies.  The  second  component,  captured  by  the  third  term  in  (2),  includes 
interactions among the business environment variables. This is again paying heed to the diagnostic 
approach to growth, and more specifically, to the notion of country-specific bottlenecks (Kremer 
1993). Policies often have important indirect effects on other policies, and some bottlenecks may 
have  especially  pronounced  indirect  effects.  Those  with  important  positive  externality  for  other 
policies are likely binding constraints and should receive higher priority in the reform agenda. This 
literature also notes that it is often difficult to find the interaction effects, perhaps  because most 
existing studies have relied on country-level data, which may not offer sufficient variations. Our 
investigation of the indirect effects of policies is, therefore, new to the diagnostic approach. We also 
allow for country-specific coefficients for the interaction terms so that the indirect effects of a policy 
reform are allowed to differ because of the difference in policy complementarity.  
Since the business environment measures,    
  , are observed only once at the end of the 
sample period, to avoid exaggerating estimation precision, we only use observations in year 2002 for 
our  cross-sectional  estimation.  Thus,  although  we  have  panel  data  for  three  years  for  financial 
variables,  the  regression  samples  consist  of  the  cross-sectional  sample  of  the  final  year  (2002). 
However, in estimating productivity, we made use of all available data from 2000 to 2002 to improve 
the reliability of the productivity measures. Since some of the explanatory variables vary only at the 
city level, we cluster the standard errors at the city level to account for within-city correlation of the 
error terms and to avoid overstating estimation precision (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan 2004).  
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Finally, since TFP (and log labor productivity) have significant outliers, we winsorize them at the tail 
1 percent level. Winsorizing at the tail 2 percent and 5 percent leads to qualitatively identical results.  
  Variables measuring the local business environment that a firm faces are constructed using 
city level averages of survey responses from other firms in the same city,
 20 an approach that is 
widely  used  (Dollar  et  al.  2005,  2006;  Hallward-Driemeier  et  al.  2006;  Xu  forthcoming).  By 
averaging the reports of other firms, we avoid an obvious type of endogeneity: The reported data may 
be  the  result  of  a  choice  made  by  the  firm,  and  may,  therefore,  be  related  to  its  unobserved 
productivity. Our identifying assumption is that these city-level averages are good proxies for the 
business environment of firms and that they are not correlated with a firm’s specific capability. To 
the  extent  that  this  assumption  is  true,  our  estimation  of  the  business  environment  effects  is 
consistent.  For the correlations between the business environment variables, see the appendix. 
This is a strong identifying assumption. It can be violated if a firm’s location choice is related 
to the local business environment or when we have omitted city-level variables that are correlated 
with our city-level proxies of the local business environment. However, with cross-sectional data 
available  and  with  multiple  environmental  variables,  we  do  not  have  convincing  exclusion 
restrictions. We do believe that our business environment measures capture many important facets of 
a city’s business environment, and the issue of omitted city information is less serious than it seems 
because we also control for country dummies, which hold the level of economic, political and social 
development constant. Furthermore, we often use multiple proxies of some business environment 
factors such as labor flexibility, and robust results on each proxy would boost our confidence that our 
results  are  not  badly  influenced  by  endogeneity  biases.  Still,  our  results  should  be  properly 
interpreted as suggestive of the importance of various business environmental factors in determining 
productivity. Confidence in our results becomes stronger when they are also consistent with our 
priors, other documented evidence, and complementary evidence.   
  In using city averages, we assume a strong city component in business environment. If true, 
we must observe city-level variations. To check this, we regress those key variables observed at the 
firm level onto all city dummies. The null hypothesis that all dummy variables have zero coefficients 
is rejected in every case at the 1 percent significance level. These results are not surprising given the 
substantial variations in policies, policy implementation and business practices in across large cities 
in both China and India. They are also consistent with recent literature. Hallward-Driemeier et al. 
                                                           
20 We dropped an Indian city from our sample since the city has only one relevant observation.  
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(2010) and Hallward-Driemeier and Pritchett (2010) emphasize that policy implementation differs 
greatly across regions even though firms within a country face the same de jure institutions. They 
show evidence that de facto enforcement of policies differ greatly at the local level within a country, 
and de facto business environment may matter much more than de jure business environment. Since 
enforcement of policies tends to be decided at the city level, we measure our environmental variables 
at the city level.
21 
Results from the Baseline Specification  
We  first  report  the  regression  results  from  the  most  restricted,  also  the  most  common, 
baseline specification—all coefficients are assumed to be the same for the two countries, and there 
are  no  interactions  among  the  business  environment  variables.  This  specification  assumes 
homogeneous policy effects across the two countries. For comparison purposes, we report results 
when productivity is either measured by TFP or by log labor productivity. In the latter case, we also 
control for the interactions of industry dummies with log capital-labor ratio. Since the environmental 
variables are correlated with each other (Appendix table), we are concerned about the effects of 
multicollinearity when we include all of them in the regression. We therefore start by including them 
one by one in our regressions, and then include them all together to see if the results change much.  
Only  one  environmental  variable,  deal  uncertainty,  has  different  results  between  the  one-by-one 
specification and the all-included specification.  We present the results based on labor productivity in 
table 4, and those based on TFP in table 5. 
Comparing the results in tables 4 and 5 reveals that we obtain qualitatively identical results 
whether we use labor productivity or TFP as the dependent variable. For this reason, our discussion 
below  will  focus  on  results  in  table  5  where  we  use  TFP  as  the  dependent  variable.  The three 
indicators of labor flexibility—the share of nonpermanent workers, the share of large firms, and 
lagged firm size—all have positive and statistically significant (or close to being so) coefficients.
22 
                                                           
21 Alternatively, we can measure it at the provincial or state level. However, measuring this way suffers from two 
problems. First, given that recent studies find enforcement matter a great deal, it is more appropriate to measure the 
business environment at the more decentralized city level. Second, given the state and province tend to have some 
policy formulation role, provincial measures of the environment may reflect better de jure policy environment.  
However,  recent  studies  have  shown  convincingly  that  what  matters  tend  to  be  de  facto  rather  than  de  jure 
regulations  (Hallward-Driemeier  et  al.  2010;  Hallward-Driemeier  and  Pritchett  2010).  Finally,  we  have  more 
variations at the city than at the province/state level, and given the number of policy variables we examine, more 
degrees of freedom also provide a great practical advantage.  
22 It is important to point out, however, that some of our proxies for labor flexibility, such as firm size, may reflect 
other factors such as a legacy of earlier small and medium enterprise sector reservations, skills, and managerial 
control system.  We thank Giovanna Prennushi for pointing this out.  
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Higher labor flexibility alone appears to put China in front in the productivity race. Of the China 
advantage in productivity (1.20), the China advantage in (lagged) firm size (1.76) explains (in the 
accounting sense) 62%; the share of large firms, 25%; the share of nonpermanent workers, 22%.  
Labor  flexibility-related  measures,  therefore,  account  for  roughly  110%  of  the  China-India 
differential in productivity. 
Younger firms are more productive. This also favors China since Chinese firms are younger. 
The mean Chinese firm age is 3.5 years younger, and this variable therefore account for about 3% of 
the  productivity  differential  between  China  and  India.  Another  factor  that  is  positively  and 
significantly related to productivity is the share of computer-using workers. Since China has a higher 
share  of  computer-using  staff  members  (by  0.055),  this  variable  explains  about  5%  of  the 
productivity differential between China and India. In contrast, mean power reliability and the access 
to finance are not significantly related to productivity at 5 percent level. Consistently with Hallward-
Dreimeier et al. (2010), managerial time cost has positive while deal uncertainty has negative effects 
on TFP.  We thus directly use their interpretations.  The positive effect of managerial time costs 
likely reflects the fact that, holding deal uncertainty constant, locations with higher managerial time 
costs likely have higher potential gains for firms to make deals with government regulators, and this 
may increase the chance of successes of business ventures.  The negative effect of deal uncertainty, 
in contrast, reflects the fact that deal uncertainty increases transaction costs. Since China leads India 
in  both  managerial  time  cost  and  in  deal  uncertainty,  the  two  effects  are  partially  offsetting  in 
explaining  China’s  productivity  lead.  The  next  effect,  evaluated  using  country  means  for  both 
explanatory variables, is 0.088, which explains 7.3% of China’s lead in TFP.  
It  is  worth  noting  that  the  estimate  of  the  coefficient  on  the  China  dummy  is  negative, 
offsetting  the  over-contribution  of  the  environmental  variables  to  the  observed  China-India 
productivity  gap,  by  an  economically  and  statistically  significant  35%.  This  suggests  that  the 
regression model is likely misspecified. By forcing the  productivity effects of the environmental 
variables to be the same between China and India, this specification may have overestimated the 
effects for China and underestimated the effects for India, letting the China dummy to compensate 
for the specification biases.  
Allowing for Country-specific Environmental Effects  
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Going a step further, we now allow the business environment variables to have country-
specific coefficients on TFP and present the regression results in table 6.
23  The reported coefficient 
for a particular variable in a country reflects the total effect of this variable on TFP in that country, 
and is therefore directly comparable for China and India. 
The results on firm characteristics are interesting.  Lagged firm size has a larger coefficient in 
China (0.46) than in India (0.39), sugge sting that Chinese firms benefit more from  economies of 
scale than Indian firms.  This renders support to the notion that labor regulation is more damaging for 
large firms in India. Moreover, younger firms are  more productive only in China. Since Chinese 
firms are on average 3.5 years younger than Indian firms, this finding suggests that the Chinese 
economy had been able to derive more benefits from growth and innovations.  
Our physical infrastructure proxy, power quality, has statistically insignificant effect on TFP 
in China, but a negative and statistically significant effect on productivity in India. This strange result 
–-normally one expects that power quality should be positively correlated with productivity-- likely 
reflects a reverse causality: Infrastructure investment takes time to plan and complete. With only a 
decade in pursuing growth oriented policies, India was likely behind in infrastructure investment. 
Regions with higher growth might therefore have felt more acutely the constraints of power supply 
than other regions. This is not the case in China because China had invested aggressively in power 
generation capacity since the 1990s and China likely did not face binding capacity constraint in 
electricity in our sample period, a period of global economic recession and reduced demand for 
Chinese manufactures.  
Similar to the results in table 5, estimates of the coefficient of the access to finance variable, 
city share of overdraft facility, are all positive, but not statistically significant for both countries. 
However, the previously found positive effects of the average share of computer-using staff members 
are no longer observed among Indian firms, but appear to have larger magnitude among China firms 
(1.63 here versus 1.17 in table 5). Thus, skills do have significant and much larger payoffs in China 
than in India, and the common effects specification in the previous table wrongly infer positive 
effects of skills in India. 
  The  effects  of  the  city-level  labor  flexibility  measure,  positive  and  significant  in  both 
countries, are now much bigger in India than in China. The coefficient of the share of nonpermanent 
                                                           
23 Results based on log labor productivity are very similar.  
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workers is six times larger in India than in China (2.09 versus 0.33). Interestingly, the estimate of the 
coefficient of the share of large firms is statistically significant only in China. While the estimate of 
the coefficient for India is very small and insignificant (0.29), it is quite large for China at 1.05 and 
statistically highly significant. Labor flexibility may thus generate benefits beyond simple internal 
economies of scale, which are measured by the coefficient on lagged firm size. By removing the 
regulatory constraints on firm size, firms within a city grow larger and more firms enter. Each firm 
benefits from economies of agglomeration. Our estimates show Chinese firms benefit far more from 
economies of agglomeration than their Indian counterparts.  
  The  estimates  of  the  effects  of  managerial  time  costs  and  deal  uncertainty  in  India  are 
qualitatively identical to those in table 5. But the estimates of the effects in China have similar signs, 
but are not statistically significant. This suggests that deal environment is more important in India 
than  in  China.  The  more  adverse  effects  of  deal  uncertainty  in  India  are  consistent  with  some 
economics and politics literature such as Shleifer and Vishney (1993) and Berkowitz and Li (2000). 
Sun and Johnson (2009) argues that decentralized corruption (i.e., many regulators can collect tolls 
for a certain business deal) commonly associated with India tends to pose more damaging effects on 
efficiency than centralized corruption, commonly associated with China. 
Moving from the common-effects specification reported in table 5 to the country-specific 
effects specification reported in table 6 has resulted in much more informative inference about the 
differences in how environmental variables impact firm-level productivity in the two countries. The 
differences are economically and statistically significant. Interestingly, the China dummy is now 
positive and statistically insignificant once we allow country-specific effects in the specification. Our 
results  thus  suggest  that  the  China-India  difference  in  average  productivity  at  the  firm-level  is 
attributable to the set of included environmental variables in the more flexible specification.  
But the results also show that infrastructure and finance do not matter importantly in either 
country. Is this really so?  
Allowing for Interactions among the Environmental Variables 
Both China and India are countries with many significant distortions (Hsieh and Klenow 
2009). Reforms that eliminate  one distortion often have indirect welfare effects by loosening or 
aggravating the effect of other distortions. An empirical strategy to identify the importance of  a 
specific policy would be to allow this policy to interact with other policies in the outcome function.  
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Even if a policy does not generate any direct effect on productivity, if its implementation makes other 
policies more effective in improving productivity,
24 it is desirable to have (Hausman et al. 2005). 
  Since our policy variables vary only at the city level and we have  a limited number of cities 
in our sample, multicollinearity would be a serious problem if we were to incorporate all possible 
interactions  among  variables  measuring local business environment .    To adopt a parsimonious 
specification, we tried a full set of China - and India-specific interaction terms. None of the China -
specific  interaction  terms  are  statistically  significant   at  5  percent  level .  For  India,  only  two 
interaction terms are statistically significant. In Table 7, we present the results from a specification 
that includes only two of the statistically significant interactions for the India sample.  
  Before proceeding to discuss the other coefficients, we note that the China dummy is now 
positive and significant at 5 percent level. This implies that  Chinese firms  exhibit unobserved 
advantage that is not captured by our explanatory variables.  However, we probably should not read 
too much into this unobservable-based advantage since once we deal with outlier issues later, the 
China dummy becomes statistically insignificant. 
  For India, our proxy of labor flexibility (including both the share of non-permanent workers 
and the share of large firms)  and power reliability are complementary, and thus the payoff to labor 
flexibility is higher where power is more reliable. This makes sense since better power supply would 
increase the payoff of labor flexibility and the option to expand when business opportunities arise. In 
addition, our proxy of labor flexibility is complementary with access to finance in India. Again, this 
makes sense: access to short-term bank loans would boost the return to labor flexibility, for instance, 
by  giving  the  firm  the  option  to  add  a  work  shift  by  increasing  working  capital  and  labor 
simultaneously.  
  Our results suggest that the interaction variables have different effects within various regions 
of the same country. To see this, we compute the marginal effect  of an environmental variable   
conditional on particular percentiles of a vector of other interacting environmental variables  , or 
   
    
                 
    ,  where      measures  the  direct  effect  of    ,  and     
   measures  the 
interaction effects of    and  . We analyze the marginal effects at the median and the 90th percentile 
of   and present the results in table 8. 
                                                           
24Interestingly, Hausman, Rodrik, and Velasco (2005) believe it is difficult if not impractical to identify the indirect 
effects of reforms.  
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  For India, while the marginal effect of infrastructure quality measured at the median shares of 
non-permanent workers is negative, as the complementary environmental factor improves to reach 
the  90th  percentile,  the  marginal  effect  of  infrastructure  becomes  positive,  substantive,  and 
statistically significant. Thus, in India, infrastructure quality matters only in cities which offer more 
de facto labor flexibility (by Indian standards). Similarly, in India, labor flexibility as measured by 
city share of non-permanent workers has much higher marginal impact on TFP in cities with top 90
th 
percentile power reliability than in cities with the median level power reliability.  The city share of 
large firms does not have much marginal impact on TFP at the median access to finance, but has 
positive and significant  marginal effect  at the 90
th percentile for the  conditioning environmental 
factor.  And access to finance matters much more at the 90th percentile than at the median of the 
share of large firms.  These findings on India echo the finding of policy complementarity found in 
Aghion et al (2008), though the complementarity detail there differs from ours. In their paper, it is 
complementarity  between  product  market  deregulation  and  labor  flexibility.  In  our  paper,  it  is 
between labor flexibility and both access to finance and infrastructure.  For China, the fact that we do 
not find significant complementarity of the various elements  perhaps suggests that none of these 
elements constitute key bottlenecks for China’s development. 
Robustness Checks 
We  have  used  a  trimmed  sample  as  a  way  to  deal  with  outliers  by  winsorizing  the 
productivity  measure  at  the  tail  1  percent.  We  mentioned  earlier  that  our  results  would  remain 
qualitatively unchanged if we winsorize at the tail 2 percent or the tail 5 percent. In table 9, we report 
the results of four additional sensitivity checks. First, we report the robust regression results using the 
original TFP measure (i.e., without winsorizing). This gives lower weights for observations eligible 
to be considered as outliers.
25 For the majority of observations, the weight is between 0.90 and 1.00. 
The results are broadly consistent with those in table  7. A downside of using robust regressions is 
that they do not accommodate the clustering option, which could exaggerate the estimation precision. 
Second, we use OLS regressions that allow clustering at the city level  for estimating the standard 
errors, but drop those observations whose weights obtained in the robust regression are in the bottom 
1 percent and 5 percent. The results, reported in third and fourth columns in table 9, are again broadly 
consistent with those in table  7. And finally,  we estimate the same empirical specification using 
median regression (also known as the least absolute value regression) , which also has the effect of 
                                                           
25 This is implemented with Stata’s ―rreg‖ command.  
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downplaying the importance of outliers. Again, we obtain similar results. These robustness checks 
confirm that our empirical findings are not artifacts of the ways with which we deal with outliers.  
V.   Conclusion 
  In this paper, we aim to explore the role of the local business environment in explaining the 
China–India productivity difference. We find that India has worse skills (or IT), infrastructure, and 
labor flexibility, but has better access to finance and lower regulation uncertainty. China’s large firm 
sizes along with better skills are the major factors behind its productivity advantage. Infrastructure 
appears to be a key constraint for India: it lags significantly behind China, yet it has important 
indirect effects for the effectiveness of labor flexibility. Labor flexibility also appears to be a major 
constraint for India, as witnessed by the predominance of small firms, the importance of firm size in 
accounting for the India disadvantage in productivity, and the complementarity of the share of non-
permanent workers and the city share of large firms with infrastructure or access to finance.  Finally, 
our results show that productivity effects of the local business environment vary across countries. 
Average employee skills, for instance, have much stronger payoff in China relative to India.  And 
regulation uncertainty has adverse effects only in India. 
Our  analysis  suggests  that  a  useful  way  for  understanding  country-specific  economic 
development is to adopt the growth diagnostic approach (Kremer 1993; Hausman et al. 2005; Aghion 
et al. 2008). This approach, which we have used here, recognizes that countries may have specific 
bottlenecks.  As  a  result,  a  prudent  empirical  researcher  would  allow  the  effects  of  policies  and 
business  environments  to  vary  by  country  and  would  take  into  account  the  effects  of  policy 
interactions.  Using  this  approach,  we  are  able  to  make  meaningful  comparisons  of  total  factor 
productivity between Chinese and Indian firms. We are also able to show that micro studies of firm 
behavior can be effective in shedding light on growth strategies for countries (Lin and Monga 2010).  
Our results also have policy implications. They suggest that India could benefit a great deal 
from reforms that allow firms to grow in size and from investment in infrastructure. Improvement in 
labor skills and in the use of information technology in the workplace in India could also help close 
the performance gap with China.  
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          Table 1. Industry Distribution of Sample Firms 
Industry 
China  India 
Number of firms  Number of firms 
Garments and leather products  279  336 
Household electronics  54  129 
Electrical equipment and parts  360  147 
Auto and parts  252  245 
Food processing  52  195 
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals  70  384 
Metallurgical products and tools  97  161 




Table 2. Differences in Performance and Firm Characteristics 
 
 
India  China 
 
mean  S.D.  10th 
percentile  median  90th 
percentile  mean  S.D  10th 
percentile  median  90th 
percentile 
TFP based on Levinsohn-Petrin estimates, 
winsorized at 1 percent. 
7.000  1.554  5.071  6.931  8.893  8.198  1.535  6.214  8.198  10.207 
Ln(Value added per employee), winsorized at 
1 percent. 
7.820  1.197  6.325  7.932  9.267  8.502  1.225  6.878  8.513  10.145 
TFPLP growth, winsorized at 1 percent.   0.029  0.496  -0.464  0.006  0.485  0.036  0.492  -0.523  0.045  0.590 
Firm age  15.874  16.739  4.000  12.000  31.000  12.302  11.449  4.000  8.000  32.000 
Value added (in million 1999 U.S. dollars)  1.008  7.546  0.007  0.052  0.856  6.389  37.331  0.050  0.689  11.347 
Number of employees  88.132  292.02  7.000  18.000  150.00  398.18  989.98  28.000  134.50  819.00  
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                                       Table 3.Differences in Firm Characteristics and the Business Environment 
 
India  China 
 
mean  S.D.  10th 
percentile  median  90th 
percentile  mean  S.D  10th 
percentile  median  90th 
percentile 
City average share of non-permanent workers  0.124  0.039  0.087  0.110  0.177  0.452  0.140  0.280  0.429  0.671 
City average share of firms with more than 
50 employees 
0.224  0.181  0.000  0.200  0.436  0.777  0.142  0.604  0.768  0.966 
City average of access to overdraft  0.560  0.205  0.176  0.588  0.775  0.300  0.107  0.163  0.264  0.531 
City share of loss of sales due to power 
outage 
0.090  0.049  0.039  0.090  0.127  0.020  0.009  0.008  0.018  0.036 
City average share of workers that regularly 
uses computer at work 
0.167  0.050  0.091  0.176  0.217  0.222  0.088  0.109  0.211  0.363 
City average share of senior manager’s time 
spent in dealing with government 
regulators 
0.139  0.064  0.125  0.067  0.220  0.199  0.022  0.199  0.169  0.226 
Within-city standard deviation of the share of 
firm-level senior manager’s time spent 
in dealing with government regulators 







Table 4.  Effects of business environment on labor productivity (log value added per employee): common 
coefficients 
China dummy  -0.430***  -0.434***  -0.094  -0.155  -0.187***  -0.258***  -0.207***  -0.676*** 
  (-3.696)  (-4.263)  (-0.988)  (-1.438)  (-2.901)  (-3.418)  (-2.839)  (-4.149) 
ln(    )  0.155***  0.135***  0.158***  0.174***  0.159***  0.158***  0.162***  0.131*** 
  (8.925)  (7.428)  (9.662)  (9.649)  (8.859)  (9.192)  (9.826)  (6.076) 
Ln(firm age)  -0.121**  -0.125**  -0.135**  -0.155***  -0.117**  -0.146***  -0.137**  -0.135** 
  (-2.139)  (-2.343)  (-2.402)  (-2.839)  (-2.222)  (-2.597)  (-2.480)  (-2.566) 
Ln(K/L)*garment  0.363***  0.406***  0.396***  0.397***  0.394***  0.414***  0.399***  0.384*** 
    & leather  (9.071)  (9.269)  (9.440)  (10.631)  (9.364)  (9.765)  (9.662)  (8.776) 
Ln(K/L)*eletrical  0.348***  0.358***  0.363***  0.330***  0.330***  0.351***  0.361***  0.319*** 
  (8.785)  (8.727)  (8.644)  (8.156)  (8.896)  (8.396)  (8.584)  (8.018) 
Ln(K/L)*electronics  0.408***  0.415***  0.412***  0.401***  0.407***  0.400***  0.414***  0.398*** 
  (9.195)  (9.244)  (9.491)  (9.034)  (9.083)  (10.122)  (9.340)  (8.582) 
Ln(K/L)*auto & parts  0.425***  0.391***  0.396***  0.377***  0.392***  0.400***  0.397***  0.391*** 
  (8.562)  (8.199)  (7.885)  (7.474)  (8.022)  (7.762)  (8.004)  (7.923) 
Ln(K/L)*food   0.460***  0.448***  0.454***  0.455***  0.452***  0.438***  0.454***  0.429*** 
   processing  (7.530)  (7.448)  (7.557)  (7.619)  (7.791)  (6.840)  (7.532)  (6.890) 
Ln(K/L)*chemical  0.425***  0.427***  0.419***  0.405***  0.426***  0.389***  0.421***  0.378*** 
    & pharmaceutical  (10.564)  (10.939)  (10.688)  (8.585)  (10.488)  (8.273)  (10.535)  (7.133) 
Ln(K/L)*metal & tools  0.228***  0.223***  0.219***  0.213***  0.237***  0.201***  0.221***  0.214*** 
  (4.621)  (4.975)  (4.806)  (4.655)  (4.875)  (4.375)  (4.715)  (4.576) 
City share of non-  0.849***              0.665*** 
   permanent workers  (3.005)              (3.338) 
City share of large     0.577***            0.559*** 
   firms    (3.167)            (2.870) 
City share of overdraft      0.268          0.024 
   access      (1.340)          (0.139) 
City power supply         -0.456        -0.677 
   quality        (-0.495)        (-0.780) 
City labor skills          1.109**      0.803* 
          (2.553)      (1.783) 
City managerial time            1.169*    3.193*** 
   cost            (1.923)    (2.682) 
Within-city S.D. of               0.811  -2.768** 
   managerial time cost              (1.430)  (-2.508) 
N observations  2,291  2,429  2,404  2,257  2,381  2,231  2,429  1,951 
Adjusted R2  0.351  0.362  0.360  0.358  0.362  0.348  0.358  0.354 
Note.  * statistically significant at 10 percent level; **, 5 percent; ***, 1 percent. 




Table 5.  Effects of business environment on TFP: common coefficients 
China dummy  -0.179  -0.138  0.217*  0.168  0.085  0.033  0.105  -0.421** 
  (-1.133)  (-0.863)  (1.797)  (1.294)  (1.031)  (0.328)  (1.095)  (-2.248) 
ln(    )  0.451***  0.441***  0.461***  0.482***  0.462***  0.462***  0.468***  0.425*** 
  (20.339)  (21.188)  (24.319)  (22.368)  (23.658)  (21.910)  (23.739)  (19.194) 
Ln(firm age)  -0.147***  -0.151***  -0.162***  -0.174***  -0.139***  -0.166***  -0.158***  -0.148*** 
  (-2.616)  (-2.886)  (-2.912)  (-3.148)  (-2.729)  (-2.906)  (-2.859)  (-2.839) 
City share of non-        0.958**              0.809*** 
    Permanent workers  (2.485)              (3.140) 
City share of large     0.559**            0.555** 
    Firms    (2.143)            (2.193) 
City share of overdraft      0.348          0.070 
    Access      (1.364)          (0.382) 
City power supply         -1.208        -1.250* 
    Quality        (-1.093)        (-1.667) 
City labor skills          1.370***      1.173*** 
          (2.732)      (2.696) 
City managerial time            0.983    3.987*** 
    Cost            (1.348)    (3.446) 
Within-city S.D. of               0.313  -3.695*** 
    Managerial time cost              (0.462)  (-3.361) 
N observations  2,291  2,429  2,404  2,257  2,381  2,231  2,429  1,951 
Adjusted R2  0.625  0.618  0.616  0.620  0.620  0.615  0.615  0.636 
Note.  * statistically significant at 10 percent level; **, 5 percent; ***, 1 percent. 
Standard errors, clustered at the city level, in parentheses.  Intercept not reported.  
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Table 6. Effects of business environment on TFP:  country-specific coefficients 
China dummy  0.108 
  (0.264) 
India * ln(    )  0.388*** 
  (11.887) 
India * ln(firm age)  0.054 
  (1.156) 
India * city share of non-permanent workers  2.093* 
  (1.949) 
India * city share of large firms  0.286 
  (1.043) 
India * city share of overdraft facility  0.091 
  (0.526) 
India * city level of power-supply quality  -1.680** 
  (-2.090) 
India * city labor skills  -0.002 
  (-0.003) 
India * city average of share of managerial time on regulators  3.811*** 
  (3.300) 
India * within-city S.D. of the share of managerial time on regulators  -3.929*** 
  (-2.966) 
China * ln(    )  0.460*** 
  (15.642) 
China * ln(firm age)  -0.420*** 
  (-7.971) 
China * city share of non-permanent workers  0.327** 
  (2.068) 
China * city share of large firms  1.047*** 
  (4.232) 
China * city share of overdraft facility  0.158 
  (0.463) 
China * city level of power-supply quality  4.064 
  (0.921) 
China * city labor skills  1.630*** 
  (5.426) 
China * city average of share of managerial time on regulators  0.133 
  (0.088) 
China * within-city S.D. of the share of managerial time on regulators  1.139 
  (1.394) 
Adjusted R2  0.649 
Note.   * statistically significant at 10 percent level; **, 5 percent; ***, 1 percent.     
Standard errors, clustered at the city level, in parentheses.   
Intercept not reported.  The number of observations is 1951.  
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Table 7. Business environment and TFP:  Country-specific coefficients with interactions 
China dummy  0.972** 
  (2.193) 
China * city share of non-permanent workers  0.324** 
  (2.090) 
China * city share of large firms  1.060*** 
  (4.233) 
China * city share of overdraft facility  0.173 
  (0.503) 
China * city level of power-supply quality  3.973 
  (0.921) 
China * city labor skills  1.581*** 
  (5.204) 
China * city average of share of managerial time on regulators  0.203 
  (0.135) 
China * within-city S.D. of the share of managerial time on regulators  1.225 
  (1.565) 
India * city share of non-permanent workers  10.275*** 
  (7.493) 
India * city share of large firms  -2.941*** 
  (-3.656) 
India * city share of overdraft facility  -0.266 
  (-1.238) 
India * city level of power-supply quality  -13.950*** 
  (-6.152) 
India * city labor skills  -0.018 
  (-0.033) 
India * city average of share of managerial time on regulators  4.717*** 
  (5.784) 
India * within-city S.D. of the share of managerial time on regulators  -4.275*** 
  (-4.495) 
India * city share of nonpermanent workers * city infrastructure quality  94.879*** 
  (5.412) 
India * city share of large firms * city access to overdraft facility  4.544*** 
  (3.621) 
Country dummy * ln(    ) or ln(firm age)  yes 
Adjusted R2  0.652 
Note.   * statistically significant at 10 percent level; **, 5 percent; ***, 1 percent. 
Standard errors, clustered at the city level, in parentheses.    Intercept not reported. 
We have tried all potential interaction terms.  We only kept those interaction terms that are statistically 




                 Table 8. Marginal Effects of interacting business environment variables  









X = non-Permanent  
     At median X 
     At 90
th percentile of X 
 
-3.53 (0.67)*** 
 2.87 (1.12)** 
     
X = power reliability 
     At median X 
     At 90
th percentile of X 
   
1.75 (0.88)* 
6.58  (0.89)*** 
   
X = overdraft access 
     At median X 
     At 90
th percentile of X 
     
-0.27 (0.19) 
0.58  (0.26)** 
 
X = share of large firms 
     At median X 
     At 90
th percentile of X 
       
0.64 (0.17)*** 
1.71 (0.41)*** 
Note.   * statistically significant at 10 percent level; **, 5 percent; ***, 1 percent. 
Non-permanent  = city average share of non-permanent workers. 
Large firms = City share of firms with more than 50 employees. 
Power reliability = the negative of the city share of losses of sales due to power outage. 
Overdraft access = city share of firms with access to overdraft facilities. 
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china dummy  0.636  0.613  0.880*  -0.221 
  (1.098)  (1.437)  (1.931)  (-0.320) 
India * city share of non-permanent workers  8.939***  9.588***  9.347***  7.248*** 
  (4.347)  (6.442)  (7.304)  (2.966) 
India * city share of large firms  -2.597***  -2.513***  -2.410***  -2.218* 
  (-2.732)  (-3.709)  (-3.242)  (-1.952) 
India * city share of overdraft facility  -0.211  -0.227  -0.165  -0.097 
  (-0.884)  (-1.205)  (-0.914)  (-0.342) 
India * city level of power-supply quality  -12.644***  -13.501***  -11.959***  -11.591*** 
  (-4.017)  (-5.757)  (-5.641)  (-3.092) 
India * city labor skills  -0.311  -0.426  0.134  -0.811 
  (-0.477)  (-0.871)  (0.249)  (-1.045) 
India * city average of share of managerial time on regulators  4.839***  5.141***  4.815***  4.167*** 
  (5.370)  (5.825)  (5.788)  (3.874) 
India * within-city S.D. of the share of managerial time on   -3.964***  -4.205***  -3.881***  -3.683*** 
         regulators  (-4.218)  (-4.811)  (-4.308)  (-3.298) 
India * city share of nonpermanent workers * city infrastructure   82.967***  89.180***  78.863***  77.454*** 
         quality  (3.392)  (5.401)  (4.833)  (2.661) 
India * city share of large firms * city access to overdraft facility  4.063***  4.015***  3.754***  3.615** 
  (2.983)  (4.148)  (3.300)  (2.224) 
China * city share of non-permanent workers  0.281  0.291  0.346**  0.342 
  (1.048)  (1.471)  (2.083)  (1.067) 
China * city share of large firms  1.242***  1.318***  1.082***  1.199*** 
  (3.760)  (5.757)  (4.152)  (3.032) 
China * city share of overdraft facility  0.183  0.110  0.196  0.230 
  (0.440)  (0.362)  (0.529)  (0.466) 
China * city level of power-supply quality  3.715  2.092  3.414  2.012 
  (0.849)  (0.446)  (0.771)  (0.385) 
China * city labor skills  1.308**  1.152***  1.407***  0.997 
  (2.417)  (3.434)  (4.203)  (1.540) 
China * city average of share of managerial time on regulators  0.454  1.229  0.785  1.792 
  (0.179)  (0.912)  (0.461)  (0.591) 
China * within-city S.D. of the share of managerial time on   1.328  0.602  0.773  1.726 
          regulators  (0.784)  (0.791)  (0.962)  (0.850) 
Country dummies * firm size or firm age  Yes  Yes  Yes  yes 
N obs  1,951  1,854  1,931  1,951 
Adjusted R2  0.666  0.733  0.676   
Note.   * statistically significant at 10 percent level; **, 5 percent; ***, 1 percent. 
Standard errors in parentheses.  Standard errors for OLS are clustered at the city level,.    Intercept and the 
interaction of country dummies with firm size or firm age are not reported. 
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City share of 
non-permanent 
workers 
City share of 
large firms 




City share of 
loss of sales 
due to power 
outages 
City share of 
computer-using 
staff 
City average of 
time costs 
City share of 
large firms 
0.801           
0.000           
2493           
             




-0.433  -0.302         
0.000  0.000         
2575  2624         
             
City share of 
loss of sales 
due to power 
outages 
0.606  0.654  -0.427       
0.000  0.000  0.000       
2401  2460  2534       
             
City share of 
computer-using 
staff 
0.357  0.445  -0.167  0.196     
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000     
2547  2598  2681  2512     
             
City average of 
time costs 
0.470  0.552  -0.194  0.553  0.090   
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000   
2379  2428  2506  2408  2483   
             
City deal 
uncertainty 
0.369  0.455  -0.101  0.345  0.007  0.815 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.719  0.000 
2598  2650  2735  2557  2707  2529 
 
Note. For each cell, the first row represents the coefficient of correlation, the second row the p-value of statistical 
significance, and the third row the number of observations. 